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POLICING THE CORPORATE
CITIZEN: ARGUMENTS FOR
PROSECUTING ORGANIZATIONS
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ABSTRACT
Alaska’s corporate criminal liability statute exposes organizations to
criminal liability for the actions of their agents, as long as agents intended the
organization to benefit from their actions. Organizations cannot disclaim
liability through codes of conduct or corporate policies, and their liability
extends beyond any merger, consolidation, or dissolution. This Article argues
that criminally prosecuting an organization is advantageous because it allows
greater criminal fines and carries collateral consequences. In addition,
criminally prosecuting an organization may be easier than criminally
prosecuting an individual because Fifth Amendment privileges and hearsay
obstacles do not apply. Corporations accrue the knowledge of their agents, so
proving specific intent may also be less difficult. Finally, this Article describes
considerations that should be weighed when deciding whether to prosecute a
particular organization. The author argues that Alaska’s corporate criminal
liability statute is a powerful tool that, where appropriate, should be used
more often.
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INTRODUCTION
When charging cases, Alaska prosecutors too often overlook crucial
potential defendants: the organizations1—corporations, companies,
partnerships, and other entities—on whose behalf individual
wrongdoers act. Alaska law casts a wide net for liability by making
organizations liable for the criminal conduct of their agents,2 and by
authorizing larger criminal fines against convicted organizations than

1. The term “organization” is used throughout this article because, under
Alaska criminal law, “organization” encompasses multiple entity types. ALASKA
STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(43) (2006). Nevertheless, much of the case law and academic
work on this topic is couched in terms of “corporations.” For the purposes of this
article, there is no distinction between these terms and they are used
interchangeably.
2. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.130 (2006).
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against convicted individuals.3 These considerations beg the obvious
question: why are organizations not investigated and prosecuted more
frequently? The most likely explanation is that few prosecutors are
aware of how far-reaching an organization’s criminal liability extends.
In addition, correctly or incorrectly, some prosecutors likely view the
prosecution of an organization as an unwanted hassle—the prosecution
would be different than their typical cases and may well involve highpaid corporate counsel unfamiliar with criminal practice.4 Finally, some
prosecutors might mistakenly believe that organizational prosecutions
punish innocent shareholders rather than actual wrongdoers.5 Thus, it
has not been common practice in state prosecutor offices to charge
organizations.6
The Author hopes this Article will change these views and
encourage prosecutors to examine their caseloads for potential
organizational defendants. There are significant benefits to be gained by
charging organizations rather than individuals: courts will likely impose
larger fines against organizations, prosecution of an organization may
effect change within the organization, and negative publicity and other
collateral consequences will pressure the organization to settle.
Furthermore, should the case go to trial, the defense will not be able to
protect organizations’ records or utilize certain other evidentiary tools to
hamstring the prosecution’s presentation of evidence.
The aftermath of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill provides a good
illustration of why prosecuting an organization is often superior to
prosecuting an individual wrongdoer. The 1989 grounding of the tanker
Exxon Valdez spilled approximately eleven million gallons of crude oil
into Prince William Sound.7 Following the grounding, the State of
Alaska prosecuted Joseph Hazelwood, the captain of the ill-fated vessel.8
Hazelwood was convicted by a jury of negligent discharge of oil9 but

3. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035 (2006).
4. The court of appeal’s recent decision in State v. Greenpeace, Inc., 187 P.3d
499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008), which is discussed infra Part II.A, will do little to
dispel such trepidation.
5. See Spencer R. Fisher, Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
367, 368 (2004) (citations omitted).
6. The author is not aware of any statistics kept by the Department of Law
that quantify how often organizations are charged with crimes. However, the
department is small and, anecdotally, it is evident that prosecutors bring charges
against organizations infrequently.
7. State v. Hazelwood, 836 P.2d 943, 944 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 866 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1993).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 945. The negligent discharge of oil is a misdemeanor. Id. at 944.
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received only a conditionally suspended sentence.10 Conversely, the
United States prosecuted Exxon, ultimately resulting in a negotiated
plea agreement and a combined criminal fine of one hundred million
dollars.11 The latter was a better use of prosecutorial resources and
obtained a better result.12
It is particularly common for organizations to be defendants in
several niche areas of Alaska criminal law. For example, Title 4
criminalizes various aspects of alcohol-related behavior.13 Bush pilots
who knowingly or negligently allow passengers to carry alcohol aboard
their flights can expose their air carrier to criminal liability.14 Titles 8 and
16 criminalize violations of the state’s hunting and fishing laws and
regulations.15 Fishing guides who assist their clients by knowingly or
negligently violating state fishing regulations expose their employers,
such as lodges or guiding outfits, to criminal liability.16
These principles also apply to the more “traditional” crimes
defined in Title 11 of the Alaska Criminal Code. One well-publicized
example of such a prosecution was that of Whitewater Engineering
Corporation.17 Gary Stone, a Whitewater employee, was killed in an

10. Id. The court imposed ninety days of suspended jail time and a one
thousand dollar suspended fine. Hazelwood was required to serve a one-year
period of probation and complete one thousand hours of community work
service. Id.
11. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Exxon to Pay Record One Billion
Dollars in Criminal Fines and Civil Damages in Connection with Alaskan Oil
Spill (Mar. 13, 1991) (on file with author). The U.S. Department of Justice
prosecuted both Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Corporation. The plea
agreements reached with these companies required Exxon Corporation to plead
guilty to a misdemeanor violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Exxon
Shipping Company to plead guilty to misdemeanor violations of the Clean
Water Act, Refuse Act, and Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id.
12. The author does not mean to criticize the choices made by either state or
federal prosecutors in the Exxon Valdez matter. The author was not a party to
those decisions but is confident those involved thoroughly and adequately
debated the matter.
13. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.11.501, 16.205 (2006) (importation of alcohol to dry
bush communities); ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.030 (2006) (sale of alcohol to alreadyintoxicated individuals); ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.16.051–.052 (2006) (sale of alcohol to
people less than twenty-one years of age).
14. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.11.501, 4.16.205 (2006) (importation of alcohol to
dry bush communities).
15. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 8.54.720, 16.40.290, 16.43.970 (2006).
16. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.40.290, 43.970 (2006).
17. See State v. Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235CR (Alaska
Super. Ct. indicted July 21, 2000); State v. Thom Fischer, No. 3AN-S00-6147CR
(Alaska Super. Ct. indicted July 21, 2000).
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avalanche at a Whitewater jobsite near Cordova.18 Prosecutors charged
the corporation and its president, Thom A. Fischer, with manslaughter
because key employees failed to heed avalanche warnings and failed to
observe necessary safety precautions.19 Although charges against Fischer
were ultimately dismissed, the company pled no contest to a charge of
criminally negligent homicide.20
This Article examines criminal liability of organizations under
Alaska law. Part I begins with the historical development of
organizational criminal liability in the United States and Alaska. Part II
covers the current contours of organizational criminal liability, as
codified in the Alaska Statutes and interpreted by Alaska courts. Part III
discusses the various consequences typically flowing from a conviction.
Additionally, Part IV explores practical considerations for prosecutors,
and Part V explores charging considerations for prosecutors who decide
to file charges against an organization. Within these sections and in the
Conclusion, this Article explains why it is advantageous to prosecute
organizations as opposed to solely prosecuting the individual
wrongdoers.

I. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Courts were the first to recognize corporations as legal entities
capable of suing and being sued.21 Early decisions established that
corporations could be sued in tort. In Philadelphia, Wilmington and
Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Quigley,22 the United States Supreme Court
explained in detail the policy considerations that mandated this result.23
Quigley sued the railroad for libel due to the conduct of one of its
18. Ashby Jones, Pardons Received in Whitewater (No, Not That Whitewater),
WALL ST. J., January 26, 2008, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/01/26/pardonsreceived-in-whitewater-no-not-that-whitewater.
19. Id.
20. See State v. Whitewater Eng’g Corp., No. 3AN-S00-5235CR (Alaska
Super. Ct. entered judgment Nov. 14, 2001). The Whitewater case was in the news
again at the end of Governor Frank Murkowski’s term in office. Governor
Murkowski granted the corporation a pardon. See Megan Holland, Company Off
Hook Thanks to Pardon; Family Stunned: Man was killed in an avalanche near Cordova
in 1999, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Dec. 24, 2007, at A1.
21. Cf. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809);
Louisville , Cincinnati, and Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leston, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497
(1844) (recognizing that corporations can sue and be sued but holding that the
court would look to the citizenship of the individuals who comprise the
corporation to determine jurisdiction); N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v.
United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909) (providing a detailed discussion of the
development of corporate liability, including criminal liability).
22. 62 U.S. 202 (1958).
23. Id. at 210.
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employees. The company argued that a corporation could only act
within the limits of its charter and therefore could not be held liable for
any acts of its agents that exceeded those limits. The Court rejected this
argument because it would allow corporations to do business and
interact with the public while escaping liability when corporate agents,
conducting corporate business, injure members of the public.24 By the
latter part of the nineteenth century, corporate tort liability was no
longer in dispute and lawsuits against corporations were
commonplace.25 The law imputed tortious intent from the agent to the
corporation, making the corporation liable for actual damages. The
courts would not, however, impute the intent necessary to award
punitive damages for any injuries absent a showing of wrongdoing by
the corporation itself.26
Corporate criminal liability grew from these civil liability roots.
Courts slowly acknowledged that corporations could be criminally
liable for the conduct of their agents. For example, in Commonwealth v.
Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge,27 the Massachusetts Supreme Court
upheld the indictment of a corporation for a public nuisance.28 In 1899,
the same court affirmed that corporations could be guilty of criminal
contempt in Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth.29 Regarding
corporate criminal liability, the court stated:

24. Id. at 209–10 (“There is scarcely an object of general interest for which
some association has not been formed . . . . The powers of the corporation are
placed in the hands of a governing body selected by members, who manage its
affairs, and who appoint agents that exercise its faculties for the accomplishment
of the object of its being. But these agents may infringe the rights of persons who
are unconnected with the corporation, or who are brought into relations of
business or intercourse with it. As a necessary correlative to the principle of the
exercise of corporate powers and faculties by legal representatives, is the
recognition of a corporate responsibility for the acts of those representatives.”).
25. See Reed v. Home Sav. Bank, 130 Mass. 443, 445 (Mass. 1881) (“The books
of reports for a quarter of a century show that a very large proportion of actions
of this nature, both for nonfeasance and for misfeasance, are against
corporations.”)
26. See Quigley, 62 U.S. at 213–14; Lakeshore & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Prentice,
147 U.S. 101, 116–17 (1893).
27. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (Mass. 1854).
28. Id. at 353 (upholding the indictment for constructing and maintaining a
bridge obstructing navigation on the Acushnet River).
29. 52 N.E. 445, 446 (Mass. 1899). The contempt arose from a newspaper
story about an ongoing civil case. Silas Loring had sued the town of Holden
seeking compensation for a piece of land taken by the town during a railroad
modification project. Id. The offending story included details about how much
the town had offered Loring before the filing of the suit and how much money
Loring demanded. Neither fact was admissible in the ongoing trial. Id. at 447.
When the presiding judge learned of the story, he, on his own initiative,
instituted the contempt proceeding, issued subpoenas for the corporations to
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We think that a corporation may be liable criminally for certain
offenses, of which specific intent may be a necessary element.
There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corporation specific
intent in criminal proceedings than in civil. A corporation
cannot be arrested and imprisoned in either civil or criminal
proceedings; but its property may be taken, either as
compensation for a private wrong or as punishment for a
public wrong.30
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the general principle of
corporate criminal liability in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
Co. v. United States,31 in which it upheld convictions of the railroad
corporation for paying illegal rebates.32 The Court applied the principles
governing civil liability and held that the acts of agents are imputed to
their employers, who may be penalized when the employees act within
the scope of their employment.33 Without expressly mentioning the legal
concept of respondeat superior, the Court was using it to impute
criminal liability to the corporation from the acts of its agents.
Numerous Ninth Circuit cases have endorsed this principle.34
Courts in Alaska slowly recognized organizational criminal
liability. The Alaska federal district court first addressed corporate
criminal liability in United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n.35 There, the
court considered the defendant corporation’s indictment for fishing
violations. The corporation took the position that it could not be indicted
for a felony because corporations cannot be imprisoned, a punishment
for a felony.36 The court disagreed, pointing out that a corporation may
be fined just like an individual,37 that such a penalty may be levied for

appear, and held the corporations in contempt when they appeared. Id. at 445–
46.
30. Id. at 446. (“That a corporation may be indicted for a misfeasance as well
as for a nonfeasance had been decided in this commonwealth.”).
31. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
32. Id. at 494. The corporations had paid illegal rebates to parties that had
shipped sugar on the corporation’s railway. Id. at 489–91.
33. Id. at 494.
34. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004–07 (9th Cir.
1972), and cases cited therein. See also United States v. Miller, 676 F.2d 359, 362
(9th Cir. 1982) (holding knowledge and acts of company agents could be
imputed to company and were sufficient to sustain criminal convictions against
company); United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
company liable for criminal acts of agent committed in scope of agent’s
employment).
35. 1 Alaska 217 (D. Alaska 1901).
36. Id. at 219.
37. Id.
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acts which would result in imprisonment for individuals,38 and that
there was no reason a corporation should escape such punishment.39
Essentially, the district court came to the same conclusion that the
Massachusetts Supreme Court reached fifty years earlier in Proprietors of
New Bedford Bridge40—criminal conduct and criminal intent can be
imputed to an organization from its agents.41
The Alaska legislature codified organizational criminal liability in
1978 when it revised the state criminal code according to the
recommendations of the Alaska Criminal Code Revision Commission.42
The first version of section 11.16.130 of the Alaska Statutes proposed by
the Commission was very limited.43 The Commission extended criminal
liability only to corporations and only in instances when the alleged
offense was a violation, a misdemeanor, or otherwise defined so as to
clearly indicate a legislative intent to impose criminal liability on a
corporation.44 The statute also applied to a company if the conduct was
“engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or knowingly
tolerated by” the corporation’s board of directors or a “high managerial
agent.”45
The Commission greatly expanded the scope of the preliminary
draft in the course of its deliberations. Significantly, the Commission
extended criminal liability to “organizations,”46 and the definition of the

38. Id. at 222–23.
39. Id. at 223.
40. 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339, 345–46 (1854) (holding that a corporation could be
prosecuted for misfeasance and nonfeasance crimes committed by its agents if
committed in the scope of the agent’s employment and to benefit the
corporation).
41. Interestingly, a Ninth Circuit court hearing an appeal on an Alaska case
expressed some reservations about applying the theory of respondeat superior
to impute criminal intent to a corporation. In Empire Printing Co. v. Roden, 247
F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1957), a case concerning libel claims brought by the former
territorial governor, treasurer and highway engineer against a Juneau
newspaper, the court provided dicta on point. The court of appeals stated that
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not generally apply to impose criminal
liability because the requisite mens rea cannot be inferred through agency
relationships. Id. at 17.
42. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REV. Introduction at 11–14 (Preliminary Report
1976). The Commission was made up of legislators, lawyers, judges, law
enforcement officers, and correctional agency personnel. Id. at 11.
43. See id. at 115–16. The original version of the statute considered by the
Criminal Code Revision Commission was based on OR. REV. STAT. § 161.170
(1971) and was similar to N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.20 (1965) and MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.07 (1962). Id., Commentary at 1116 (Preliminary Report 1976).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REV., Part 2 at 27–28 (Tentative Draft 1977). The
Commentary explains this change: “[T]he considerations which support holding
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term was nearly identical to the current definition of the term.47 The
Commission also changed the requirements for imposing liability under
the first subparagraph to the disjunctive, thus imposing liability if the
act was committed by the employee in the scope of his employment or to
benefit the organization.48 The legislature ultimately rejected this
construction, however, and required that the act be committed both in
the scope of the employment and to benefit the organization. The version
of the statute ultimately passed by the legislature mirrors the current
version of the statute.49

II. CURRENT CONTOURS OF ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY
An organization, once constituted, has a legal identity distinct from
its owners, officers and directors.50 It is, by statute, an artificial, legal
“person.”51 As such, an organization may commit crimes and may be
charged as a defendant in criminal cases.52 The criminal liability of
organizations is defined in section 11.16.130 of the Alaska Statutes:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, an organization is
legally accountable for conduct constituting an offense if the
conduct
(1) is the conduct of its agent, and
(A) within the scope of the agent’s employment and in
behalf of the organization; or
(B) is solicited, subsequently ratified, or subsequently
adopted by the organization; or
(2) consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of
affirmative performance imposed on organizations by law.

corporations liable for crimes apply equally to organizations which happen to be
unincorporated. This conclusion is embodied in the Proposed Federal Criminal
Code § 402 and the Revised Arkansas Criminal Code § 41-402.” Id. at 37.
47. Id. at 36. The definition did not include “government” in the list of
included entities; the legislature added that term in 1982. H.C.S. C.S.S.B. 535,
12th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1982).
48. See id. (emphasis in original) (explaining the Commission’s intent in
making this change was to “expand the principle of respondeat superior on an
organization” under either scenario).
49. S.C.S. C.S.H.B. 661, 10th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1978).
50. See State v. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d 575, 577 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
51. ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.060(a)(8) (2006) (“‘[P]erson’ includes a corporation,
company, partnership, firm, association, organization, business trust, or society,
as well as a natural person.”).
52. ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.130 (2006).
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(b) In this section “agent” means a director, officer, or
employee of an organization or any other person who is
authorized to act in behalf of the organization.
The Alaska Court of Appeals described the essence of this liability
in State v. ABC Towing.53 The decision contrasts the theories of
organizational criminal liability, set forth in section 11.16.130 of the
Alaska Statutes, with the better known theories of accomplice criminal
liability, set forth in section 11.16.110 of the Alaska Statutes.54 In drawing
this comparison, the court of appeals noted organizations face broader
criminal liability than individuals because organizations are liable for
conduct of their agents that owners, members, officers or directors do
not know about until after the fact.55
The kinds of entities subject to such liability are also defined by
statute: “‘[O]rganization’ means a legal entity, including a corporation,
company, association, firm, partnership, joint stock company,
foundation, institution, government, society, union, club, church, or any
other group of persons organized for any purpose.”56 As such,
organizations are broadly exposed to criminal liability for the acts of
their agents. This poses an obvious problem for organizations, whose
main purpose is to pool resources, maximize profit potential, and limit
the liability of those individuals involved.57 At cross purposes with this
last principle, Alaska law imposes criminal liability in cases where
individual conduct, when appropriately construed as corporate conduct,
runs afoul of state criminal law.
Many critics question whether organizations should be prosecuted
at all and argue that such prosecutions punish innocent shareholders
rather than the actual wrongdoer. The Ninth Circuit provided a succinct
rebuttal to that suggestion in United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp:
Legal commentators have argued forcefully that it is
inappropriate and ineffective to impose criminal liability upon

53. 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
54. See id. at 576–77.
55. See id.
56. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(43) (2006). The definition does not include
“sole proprietorship.” The court of appeals interprets this omission to mean the
legislature did not intend to expose such entities to criminal liability in their own
right. To the contrary, a sole proprietorship is the alter ego of the sole proprietor
and therefore any charges must be alleged against the sole proprietor in his or
her individual capacity. ABC Towing, 954 P.2d at 577–78.
57. 1 WILLIAM MEAD FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1–5 (rev. vol. 2006). The common law fostered this
purpose; it did not expose organizations to criminal liability. N.Y. Cent. &
Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492–93 (1909).
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a corporation, as distinguished from the human agents who
actually perform the unlawful acts . . . particularly if the acts of
the agents are unauthorized. . . . But it is the legislative
judgment that controls, and “the great mass of legislation
calling for corporate criminal liability suggests a widespread
belief on the part of legislators that such liability is necessary to
effectuate a regulatory policy.”58
The crux of the argument is that organizational criminal liability
prompts organizations to more rigorously police their agents.
Regardless of whether this is true, the existence of corporate and, more
generally, organizational criminal liability is beyond debate.59
A. Alaska Jurisprudence
Most examples of organizational criminal liability in Alaska occur
under section 11.16.130(a)(1)(A) of the Alaska Statutes—conduct of an
agent that is done in the scope of the agent’s employment and on behalf
of the organization.60
The Alaska appellate courts have discussed the substance of
organizational criminal liability only twice.61 In State v. ABC Towing,62
the court of appeals was called on to determine whether a towing
company, formed as a sole proprietorship, could be prosecuted for
violating a state pollution law, based on an employee’s illegal discharge
of gasoline. The issue for the court was whether a sole proprietorship is
an “organization” as defined in section 11.81.900 of the Alaska Statutes.63
The court held that it was not, because a sole proprietorship is the mere
alter ego of the sole proprietor.64 In other words, there is no legal

58. 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973). The court continued: “Moreover, the strenuous efforts of
corporate defendants to avoid conviction, particularly under the Sherman Act,
strongly suggests that Congress is justified in its judgment that exposure of the
corporate entity to potential conviction may provide a substantial spur to
corporate action to prevent violations by employees.” Id.
59. See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 721 (5th Cir.
1963) (“It is now beyond doubt that a corporation may be held criminally
liable.”).
60. That this is the most typical mode of organizational criminal liability is
not surprising. Most organizations, do not typically solicit, ratify, adopt criminal
conduct, or fail to do something required by law. ALASKA STAT. §
11.16.130(a)(1)(B)–(a)(2) (2006).
61. It was briefly commented on in a third case, Stock v. State, 526 P.2d 3
(Alaska 1974).
62. 954 P.2d 575 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998).
63. Id. at 579.
64. Id. at 577–78.
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distinction between the sole proprietor and the proprietorship; to
prosecute the proprietorship, the state must charge the proprietor.65
The court of appeals provided more recent guidance in State v.
Greenpeace, Inc.66 The State prosecuted and convicted Greenpeace, Inc.
for bringing a Greenpeace ship, the M/V Arctic Sunrise, into state waters
without a state-approved oil spill contingency plan or a certificate of
financial responsibility.67 Following the jury’s guilty verdicts against the
corporation, the district court granted a defense motion for acquittal and
set the convictions aside.68 The court of appeals affirmed the district
court based on findings that Greenpeace, Inc., a United States
corporation, was not in charge of the ship and did not control its
operators.69 According to the court, the prosecution charged the wrong
parties.70 The case involved Stichting Phoenix,71 a Dutch foundation that
owned the Arctic Sunrise, and Stichting Marine Services (SMS), a second
Dutch foundation that operated it.72 SMS chartered the ship to
Greenpeace International, a third Dutch entity, that owns the name
“Greenpeace.”73 Greenpeace International licenses this name to
independent environmental organizations around the world including
Greenpeace, Inc. in the United States.74 In 2004, Greenpeace
International agreed to let Greenpeace, Inc. use the Arctic Sunrise for an
anti-logging campaign.75 SMS supplied the crew and was also
responsible for making sure the ship complied with all local regulatory
requirements.76 The prosecution argued that SMS and the Arctic Sunrise

65. Further discussion regarding this holding is beyond the scope of this
article. However, the author takes issue with the court’s reasoning because it
needlessly insulates sole proprietorships from criminal liability where one of its
agents commits a wrong in furtherance of a business enterprise. The legislature
should fix this omission by amending the “organization” definition to
specifically include sole proprietorships. See supra note 60 and accompanying
text.
66. 187 P.3d 499 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
67. Id. at 500.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 503–11. The district court also granted a motion for acquittal
propounded by the captain of the Arctic Sunrise who had also been convicted. Id.
The court of appeals affirmed as to the first count but reversed as to the second.
Id.
70. Id. at 505.
71. “Stichting” is the Dutch word for “foundation.” Id. at 500.
72. Id. at 501.
73. Id. at 504.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 505.
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captain were agents of Greenpeace, Inc. and, therefore, Greenpeace, Inc.
was liable for the criminal conduct.77 The court of appeals disagreed:
A person or organization does not qualify as the authorized
agent of a principal unless the principal controls or has the
right to control the purported agent. The State offered no
evidence that Greenpeace, Inc., controlled how (or if) SMS or
[the captain] operated the Arctic Sunrise or complied with
Alaska’s requirements for nontank vessels.78
The prosecution also argued that Greenpeace, Inc. ratified or
adopted the criminal conduct of SMS and the Arctic Sunrise and was
therefore liable for their conduct.79 Again, the court of appeals
disagreed. The court held that adoption or ratification requires the
principal’s “awareness of the misconduct and some action to ratify or
adopt the misconduct.”80 It found that the prosecution had not produced
any evidence Greenpeace, Inc. knew of the illegal conduct or took any
actions to ratify or adopt that conduct.81
Though the court does not explicitly say, its decision suggests that
SMS, or arguably Greenpeace International, was the proper defendant.82
This holding nevertheless begs the question of whether Alaska could
effectively prosecute either of these foreign entities in state court. Service
of process on these entities would be problematic,83 and even if service
were achieved, the entities would likely argue that the Alaska state

77. See id. at 504. The State further argued that Greenpeace, Inc., Greenpeace
International, and SMS were all the same organization but were constructed as
separate entities as part of a “shell game” to avoid liability. The court disagreed
with this argument as well. Id.
78. Id. at 505.
79. See id. at 505–06; see also ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.130(a)(1)(B) (2006).
80. Id. at 506.
81. Id. This was a somewhat curious conclusion considering the fact that
Greenpeace, Inc.’s chief financial officer was on board the Arctic Sunrise at the
time of the infractions.
82. See id. (“It was SMS, not Greenpeace, Inc., that hired and paid for the
ship’s agent in Portland. . . . [I]t was SMS’s obligation to comply with regulatory
requirements for the vessel.”).
83. See ALASKA CRIM. R. 4(c)(2) (making service difficult by limiting the
service of a summons to places “within the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska”);
see also ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.763 (2006) (service on foreign corporations); ALASKA
STAT. § 10.20.046 (2006) (service on not-for-profit corporations); ALASKA STAT.
§10.40.130 (2006) (service on religious corporations); and ALASKA STAT. §
10.50.065 (2006) (service on limited liability companies). But see ALASKA STAT. §§
10.06.175(b), 06.765 (2006) (allowing the Alaska Commissioner of Commerce,
Community and Economic Development to be served if a corporation fails to
appoint or maintain a registered agent in the state).
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courts lack personal jurisdiction over them.84 Finally, it is difficult to
imagine how the state could effectively enforce any sentence ultimately
imposed by its courts.
Collectively, ABC Towing and Greenpeace, Inc. confirm the existence
of organizational criminal liability under state law. These decisions do
little, however, to define the contours and limitations of that liability
and, in fact, highlight problems with the existing laws. ABC Towing
carves out an exemption for sole proprietorships.85 Greenpeace is also
problematic in that it illustrates the ease with which organizations might
compartmentalize their operations or duplicate themselves and thereby
thwart criminal prosecution.86 These are shortcomings legislators need
to address if the prosecution of organizations is to be effectively and
consistently utilized.
Given the paucity of pertinent Alaska jurisprudence regarding
organizational criminal liability, Alaska courts would likely rely on
relevant federal authority.87 Federal cases frequently acknowledge that a
84. In fact, Alaska’s jurisdiction is quite broad. Under section 44.03.010 of the
Alaska Statutes, state territorial jurisdiction extends to waters offshore and
encompasses the “high seas” to the extent the United States exercises its
jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted this provision broadly to
include all ocean waters seaward of the Alaska coast. See State v. Jack, 125 P.3d
311, 315–16 (Alaska 2005) (allowing defendant to be prosecuted in Alaska for
sexual assault that took place onboard an Alaska Marine Highway ferry while in
Canadian waters during a voyage between Alaska and Washington). Arguably,
both entities would have sufficient contacts with the State of Alaska, based on
the sailing and operation of the Arctic Sunrise in Alaska waters, to make them
subject to the personal jurisdiction of a state court. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash.,
326 U.S. 310, 317–19 (1945) (holding contacts exist when the in-state activities of
the corporation give rise to the liabilities at issue, or the corporation fails to
satisfy obligations that exist due to its in-state activities); Kuk v. Nalley, 166 P.3d
47, 51 (Alaska 2007) (explaining that International Shoe and its progeny
significantly broadened the understanding of personal jurisdiction).
85. See 954 P.2d 575, 577–79 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998). The ABC Towing
decision is unsatisfying. Id. The court of appeals favorably compared sole
proprietorships and partnerships—both are the alter egos of the proprietor or
partners, both exist solely to carry out the business purpose for which they were
created, and both are not common law “legal entities.” Id. Nevertheless, the
court interprets the definition of “organization” in a way that treats the two
entities differently, i.e., partnerships can be prosecuted, sole proprietorships
cannot. Id. The ruling is defensible from a statutory construction standpoint, but
it is unsatisfactory from a public policy standpoint. The same policy arguments
that support the prosecution of partnerships for criminal offenses apply to sole
proprietorships. See id. There is no reason these entities should be treated
differently.
86. See supra notes 63–81 and accompanying text.
87. See State v. Lee, 999 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 2000) (noting Alaska courts use
federal Sherman Act cases to construe Alaska antitrust law); State v. Abbott, 498
P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska 1972) (holding where no Alaska cases are on point, court
may rely on federal cases that discuss a similarly worded federal statute);
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corporation can act only through its officers, agents, and employees.88
Courts therefore hold that a corporation may be liable for the acts of its
officers, employees, and other agents even though the questioned act
may be illegal, contrary to specific company policy, or not expressly
authorized beforehand by the corporation.89
B.

Existence of Organization Policies Prohibiting the Criminal
Conduct and the Requisite Quantum of Benefit

Federal cases hold that an organization may be found guilty of a
criminal offense as long as the employee was motivated, at least in part,
to benefit the organization.90 It follows that organizations often attempt
to absolve themselves of liability by relying on corporate policies that
preclude criminal conduct. These attempts have generally been
unsuccessful. The Ninth Circuit addressed such an effort in the context
of Sherman Act prosecutions.91 In Hilton Hotels Corp.,92 charges were
premised on proof that the hotel’s purchasing agent threatened a
supplier with the loss of the hotel’s business unless the supplier paid an
assessment to a trade association of which the hotel was a member.93
Hotel personnel testified that company policy required purchasing
Langfeldt-Haaland v. Saupe Enter., Inc., 768 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Alaska 1989)
(Moore, J., dissenting) (noting Alaska courts rely on interpretations of federal
rules when interpreting a similarly worded Alaska rule).
88. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988) (citing Bellis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974)).
89. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998); see also N.Y. Cent. & Hudson R.R. v. United
States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) (“[A] corporation is held responsible for acts not
within the agent's corporate powers strictly construed, but which the agent has
assumed to perform for the corporation when employing the corporate powers
actually authorized, and in such cases there need be no written authority under
seal or vote of the corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize
the act.”).
90. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1, 892–93
(D.D.C. 2006) (“[I]f a corporate agent exercises the authority conferred upon him
and performs an act within the course of his employment, the corporation is
liable—even if the act was unlawful or was done contrary to instructions or
policies, as long as the agent acted with an intent to benefit the corporation.”);
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241–42 (1st Cir. 1982) ("[C]riminal
liability may be imposed on the corporation only where the agent is acting
within the scope of his employment. That, in turn, requires that the agent be
performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform, and those acts
must be motivated—at least in part—by an intent to benefit the corporation.").
91. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972); see also
Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809); Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston R.R. Co. v. Leston, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844).
92. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
93. Id. at 1002.
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supplies solely on the basis of price, quality, and service, and they had
specifically instructed the purchasing agent not to boycott suppliers.94
The Ninth Circuit held that the hotel could not insulate itself from
criminal liability by adopting general instructions not to participate in a
boycott if it did not take sufficient actions to enforce those instructions.95
The fact remained that the hotel authorized a purchasing agent to act on
its behalf and the agent exercised complete authority as to those
responsibilities and, pursuant to that authority, added the hotel’s buying
power to the force of the boycott. 96 Other circuits have taken a similar
position when employees act contrary to company policy.97
An important corollary is that courts generally permit defendants
to admit evidence of corporate policies or instructions that forbid the
conduct at issue to support an argument that an agent was acting
outside the scope of employment or to the principal’s detriment. The
Ninth Circuit summarized this view:
[A] corporation may be liable for acts of its employees done
contrary to express instructions and policies, but that the

94. Id. at 1005.
95. Id. at 1007 (affirming trial court’s ruling excluding a jury instruction that
precluded criminal liability where the employee’s acts were unauthorized by the
corporation).
96. Id. (“The purchasing agent was authorized to buy all of appellant’s
supplies. Purchases were made on the basis of specifications, but the purchasing
agent exercised complete authority as to the source. He was in a unique position
to add the corporation’s buying power to the force of the boycott. Appellant
could not gain exculpation by issuing general instructions without undertaking
to enforce those instructions by means commensurate with the obvious risks.”).
97. In United States v. Potter, 463 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2006), the First Circuit
squarely rejected an argument that a corporation might fend off liability by
adopting abstract rules that no agent can make an unlawful price-fixing contract
or that no driver may exceed the speed limit. Id. at 25–26 (citing United States v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 406 & n. 5 (4th Cir. 1985)). Thus, a
corporation may be charged and convicted, even if there is a specific company
directive forbidding the questioned acts. The court explained that this is simply
an extension of familiar agency law principles: the principal is held liable for acts
done on its account by an agent which are customarily actions the agent is
authorized to perform. Potter, 463 F.3d at 26 (citing H. Reuschlein & Gregory,
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 167 (1990) (footnote omitted)).
The Fourth Circuit adopted very similar reasoning in United States v.
Basic Constr. Co., wherein it rejected a corporation’s attempt to insulate itself
from liability using evidence that the corporation had expressly forbidden the
conduct at issue. 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
The Restatement (Second) of Agency explains the general rule these
decisions expound by way of an illustration: P directs the salesman in selling
guns, never to insert a cartridge while exhibiting a gun. A, a salesman, does so,
and negligently harms a bystander. Notwithstanding P’s instructions otherwise,
the salesman’s act is within the scope of employment. Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 230, illus. 1 (1958) (forbidden acts).
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existence of such instructions and policies may be considered
in determining whether the employee in fact acted to benefit
the corporation. Merely stating or publishing such instructions
and policies without diligently enforcing them is not enough to
place the acts of an employee who violates them outside the
scope of his employment. It is a question of fact whether
measures taken to enforce corporate policy in this area will
adequately insulate the corporation against such acts . . . 98
Other courts have reached similar rulings.99
It is not necessary that the organization actually accrue a benefit
from the agent’s actions for criminal liability to attach. In Beusch,100 the
Ninth Circuit rejected a corporation’s argument that it could not be
liable if the criminal conduct did not in fact benefit the corporation.101
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Automated Medical
Laboratories, Inc.102 is frequently cited on this point—the court affirmed a
jury’s conviction of American Medical Laboratories for falsifying
logbooks and records required to be maintained by the Federal Drug
Administration.103 In Automated Medical Laboratories, the court held that
benefit was an evidential fact, stating:
[W]hether the agent’s actions ultimately redounded to the
benefit of the corporation is less significant than whether the
agent acted with the intent to benefit the corporation. The basic
purpose of requiring that an agent have acted with the intent to
benefit the corporation, however, is to insulate the corporation
from criminal liability for actions of its agents which be inimical
to the interests of the corporation or which may have been
undertaken solely to advance the interests of that agent or of a
party other than the corporation.104

98. United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979).
99. See, e.g., Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d at 572–73 (allowing a jury to consider a
company’s antitrust compliance policy in the prosecution of the company for
Sherman Act antitrust violations by its employees who rigged bidding on state
road paving contracts); Potter, 463 F.3d at 26 (allowing a jury to consider a
company president’s specific instructions to a subordinate not to make illegal
payments in considering fraud charges against company who bribed a state
representative).
100. 596 F.2d at 877.
101. Id.; see also Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1428–29 (9th Cir.
1989) (having purpose to benefit the principal is required, rather than actual
benefit, if agent’s actions are to be imputed to the principal).
102. 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985).
103. Id. at 407–08.
104. Id. at 407 (emphasis in original; internal citations omitted).
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These cases collectively illustrate that whether the agent’s conduct
benefits the organization is a question of fact for the jury. The cases also
demonstrate that appellate courts will let convictions stand so long as
there is some evidence that the organization gained some benefit. In
comparison, criminal conduct by an agent falling outside the scope of
employment will not be imputed to the organization where the conduct
solely benefits the agent. Such was the case in Standard Oil Co. of Texas v.
United States,105 in which the Fifth Circuit reversed convictions against
two corporate defendants because the criminal acts by the employees,
while benefiting themselves, actually injured the corporation.106
Alaska cases contemplating the application of respondeat superior
liability in the context of tort claims have echoed the holding of Standard
Oil. Notable among these are Taranto v. North Slope Borough,107 Northern
Fabrication Co., Inc. v. Arco, Inc.,108 and Ondrusek v. Murphy.109 All three
cases apply the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228 criteria to
determine whether an agent acted in the scope of his employment.
Pursuant to section 228, conduct is only in the scope of employment if—
among other requirements—it is done at least in part to serve the
employer. Thus, in Northern Fabrication Co., Inc., the Alaska Supreme
Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendant corporations and held that the corporations could only
negate the plaintiff’s claim of vicarious liability for the theft of
equipment by the defendants’ employees if the corporations could prove
they did not control the employees’ actions and the employees acted
solely in furtherance of their own personal motives.110
These cases demonstrate that an organization cannot insulate itself
from liability with general policies or guidance that forbid the conduct
at issue. However, an organization can use policies or guidance in an
effort to convince a jury that the organization took sufficient action to
prevent the wrongful conduct and should not be liable for the actions of
an agent. Moreover, the organization will not be liable for conduct that
an agent takes solely for his or her own benefit, or that is inimical to the
organization’s interests.

105. 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
106. Id. at 129. The employees falsified documents related to shipments of oil
through a pipeline. The employees personally profited by this deceit, but their
employer, the owner of the oil, lost money. Id.
107. 909 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1996).
108. No. S-8368, 1999 WL 33958767 (Alaska Jan. 27, 1999).
109. 120 P.3d 1053 (Alaska 2005).
110. 1999 WL 33958767, at *2 (citing Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc., 861
P.2d 263 (N.M. App. 1993)).
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Collective Corporate Knowledge

For a time, specific intent crimes that require proof of knowing or
intentional conduct were difficult to apply against large or diverse
organizations. Organizations tend to compartmentalize their operations
and decision-making between different units or divisions. Therefore the
requisite mens rea or conduct is often not present in any one individual,
making imputing mens rea to the organization difficult. Many courts
have resolved this problem through the collective corporate knowledge
theory best described by the First Circuit in United States v. Bank of New
England.111
The acts of a corporation are, after all, simply the acts of all of
its employees operating within the scope of their employment.
The law on corporate criminal liability reflects this. . . .
Similarly, the knowledge obtained by corporate employees
acting within the scope of their employment is imputed to the
corporation. Corporations compartmentalize knowledge,
subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into
smaller components. The aggregate of those components
constitutes the corporation’s knowledge of a particular
operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one
component of an operation know the specific activities of
employees administering another aspect of the operation . . .112
This line of reasoning enables prosecutors to impute the summed
knowledge of various employees to the organization as a whole.113

111. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 856 (internal citations omitted) (quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.D.C., Inc., 381 F.Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. W. Va. 1974) (“[A] corporation cannot
plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees
was not acquired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its
full import. Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective
knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act
accordingly.”)).
113. See Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245, 250 (8th Cir. 1958); Inland
Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951); Camacho v.
Bowling, 562 F. Supp. 1012, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 1983); United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C.,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738–39 (W.D. W. Va. 1974); United States v. Sawyer
Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971), aff'd, 463 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972);
People v. Am. Med. Ctrs. of Mich., Ltd., 324 N.W.2d 782, 793 (Mich. Ct. App.
1982); State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 696 A.2d 530, 535 (N.H. 1997). The author is
unaware of any similar Alaska or Ninth Circuit cases.
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D. Effect of Merger, Consolidation, and Dissolution
Any liability imputed to an organization will generally survive the
organization’s merger, consolidation, or dissolution. The common law
analogized the dissolution of an organization (either directly, or by
merger or consolidation) to the death of a natural person,114 meaning
that dissolved, merged, or consolidated organizations could not be
prosecuted.115
State statutes that continue the legal existence of these entities have
eroded this common law principle. It is now generally true that
organizations can be prosecuted (or sued civilly) following their
dissolution, merger or consolidation. In Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United
States,116 the United States Supreme Court discussed this abrogation of
the common law. Prosecutors indicted three related corporations for
violations of the Sherman Act.117 While the indictments were pending,
the corporations dissolved and became new divisions in a single,
separate corporation.118 The district court and court of appeals held that
the dissolution of the original corporations did not abate the
indictments.119 The Supreme Court affirmed, looking to both Maryland
and Delaware law and finding that the states had statutes “saving”
claims against dissolved corporations.120 The Court interpreted these
statutes to include criminal charges under the Sherman Act.121 Other
courts have come to the same conclusion respecting corporations and
partnerships organized under the laws of other states.122

114. H. Lowell Brown, Successor Corporate Criminal Liability: The Emerging
Federal Common Law, 49 ARK. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996) (citing Okla. Natural Gas Co.
v. Okla., 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927)).
115. Id.
116. 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
117. Id. at 271.
118. Id. at 272–73.
119. Id. at 272.
120. See id. at 272–74. The applicable Maryland statute provided that
dissolution did not “‘abate any pending suit or proceeding by or against the
corporation.’” Id. at 273 (citing Flack’s MD. CODE ANN., art. 23, § 78(a) (1951)).
The applicable Delaware statute provided that “any ‘proceeding’ begun by or
against a corporation before or within three years after dissolution shall continue
‘until any judgments, orders, or decrees therein shall be fully executed.’” Id.
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1953)).
121. Id. at 273–74.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476, 1479–80
(10th Cir. 1985) (holding Sherman Act and mail fraud prosecutions of Oklahoma
corporation and partnership, both of which dissolved prior to their indictments,
did not abate under Oklahoma statutory law); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d
856, 906–09 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring) (noting that criminal
charges against surviving corporation of a merger, formed when a former New
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There is no analogous holding in Alaska case law. The closest case
on point, Gossman v. Greatland Directional Drilling, Inc.,123 discusses the
viability of civil claims brought against a dissolved corporation for
negligent conduct during the corporation’s existence.124 Greatland
dissolved in 1993 following the purchase of its assets by Anadrill, a
distinct corporation.125 In 1995, plaintiff Gossman was injured while
working for Anadrill at one of the facilities Anadrill purchased from
Greatland.126 The injury was caused by a piece of equipment that had
been negligently modified by a Greatland employee years before the
corporation’s dissolution.127 In 1996, Gossman filed negligence claims
against Greatland.128 The Alaska Supreme Court looked to section
10.06.678 of the Alaska Statutes—a survival statute for claims against
corporations—to determine whether any provision abrogated the
common law abatement theory.129 At the time (and currently), section
10.06.678, in pertinent part, provided:
(a) A corporation that is dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily
continues to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs,
defending actions against it, and enabling it to collect and
discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its property, and
collect and divide its assets. A dissolved corporation does not
continue to exist for the purpose of continuing business except
so far as necessary for winding up the business.
(b) An action or proceeding to which a corporation is a party
does not abate by the dissolution of the corporation or by
reason of proceedings for winding up and dissolution of the
York company merged into its New York parent corporation, that arose from the
criminal conduct of the former subsidiary, did not abate under New York
corporation law which contains a saving statute preserving claims against
merged or consolidated corporations); United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass’n,
Inc., 177 F. Supp. 352, 354–55 (C.D. Cal. 1959) (holding that Sherman Act
prosecution against California corporations that dissolved before indictments
were filed did not abate under California Code where Code contains section
extending life of dissolved corporations for the purpose of defending actions
against it); Commonwealth v. Lavelle, 555 A.2d 218, 230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
(holding that state corruption prosecution against successor corporation did not
abate under Pennsylvania law where there was a de facto merger or fraudulent
transaction).
123. 973 P.2d 93 (Alaska 1999).
124. Id. at 94–95.
125. Id. at 94.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 95 n.4. (citing Hood Bros. Partners, L.P. v. USCO Distrib. Servs.
Inc., 140 F.3d 1386, 1387–88 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that a survival statute
extended the life of a corporation for litigation purposes)).
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corporation. A corporation that is dissolved voluntarily or
involuntarily may not commence a court action, except for a
court action under [section] 10.06.675.130
The court reviewed the legislative history of section 10.06.678 and
examined treatment of similar statutes in other jurisdictions before
deciding claims do not abate against a dissolved corporation.131
Gossman does not address criminal prosecutions. However, the
court’s analysis in this civil case mirrors the analysis the Supreme Court
used in Melrose Distillers in a criminal context.132 There is no reason to
believe an Alaska court would analyze the issue any differently in the
context of a criminal case. Moreover, Alaska courts routinely rely on
federal authorities when interpreting Alaska law that has no case
precedent and is similar to federal laws.133 A number of jurisdictions
have adopted Melrose Distillers,134 and Alaska courts have cited Melrose
Distillers for other propositions.135
Further, as is discussed above, the Alaska Supreme Court in
Gossman interpreted section 10.06.678 of the Alaska Statutes liberally to
include claims that accrued after the dissolution of the corporation.136
This suggests that the court would likewise liberally interpret the statute
if faced with the question of whether the statute is inclusive of criminal
charges. In short, dissolution, merger, and consolidation of a corporation
should not foreclose the State’s ability to prosecute the corporation,
although it might make it more difficult to collect fines that are
ultimately imposed.137
130. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.678(a)–(b) (2006).
131. Gossman, 973 P.2d at 95–99. If Gossman were to obtain a judgment
against Greatland, he could seek to recover the damages from Anadrill because
Anadrill purchased all of Greatland’s liabilities. Id. at 99.
132. 359 U.S. 271 (1959).
133. See Odom v. Lee, 999 P.2d 755, 761 (Alaska 2000) (Alaska courts use
federal Sherman Act cases to construe Alaska antitrust law); see also State v.
Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 717 (Alaska 1972) (where no Alaska cases on point, court
may rely on federal cases discussing similarly worded federal statute).
134. See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 908 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J.
concurring); People v. Boyce, 509 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 1987); People
v. Pymm Thermometer Corp., 591 N.Y.S.2d 459, 460 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
135. See Univ. of Alaska v. Thomas Architectural Products, Inc., 907 P.2d 448,
450 (Alaska 1995) (recognizing that Washington survival statutes supplant the
common law rule of abatement and prolong the life of a corporation so that it
can be sued); Hartwell v. State, 423 P.2d 282, 283 (Alaska 1967).
136. Gossman, 973 P.2d 95–99.
137. See id. Under Alaska law, corporations, prior to dissolution, must
provide for their outstanding liabilities by purchasing liability insurance, setting
aside assets, or having a successor assume its liabilities. Id. at 99 (citing §§
ALASKA STAT. 10.06.620(2), 06.668(1)). Anadrill had assumed all of Greatland’s
liabilities and this would include any judgment plaintiff Gossman obtained from
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Alaska has similar survival statutes that are applicable to other
organizations. However, some of the survival statutes—such as those
that apply to non-profit corporations138 or limited liability
companies139—carry time limitations which may affect potential claims
or charges.

III. PROSECUTORIAL CONSEQUENCES
A. Penalty Provisions
Organizations are not subject to the same penalties as individual
defendants. While organizations can only act through their agents,
organizations cannot be punished in the same way as their agents.140
Special penalty provisions exist for organizations based on the
severity of the underlying crime.141 In assessing a fine under these
provisions the sentencing court considers:
(1) measures taken by the organization to discipline an officer,
director, employee, or agent of the organization;
(2) measures taken by the organization to prevent a recurrence
of the offense;
(3) the organization’s obligation to make restitution to a victim
of the offense, and the extent to which imposition of a fine will
impair the ability of the organization to make restitution; and
(4) the extent to which the organization will pass on to
consumers the expense of the fine.142

his lawsuit. Id. The State would face a similar situation if it successfully
prosecuted a dissolved corporation. Depending on how the corporation
provided for its post-dissolution liabilities, the State may try to collect the
penalties imposed against an insurance policy, against a successor corporation,
or against a finite pool of assets set aside prior to the corporation’s dissolution.
In that final scenario, the assets might be insufficient, particularly if the
corporation left numerous creditors, and the State could get stuck with a
judgment it cannot collect (or not easily collect without some veil-piercing
litigation).
138. ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.450 (2006).
139. ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.440 (2006).
140. Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271, 274 (1959) (holding
that corporations cannot be sent to jail, they can only be fined).
141. Under section 12.55.035(c)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, an organization can
be fined up to a million dollars for felony offenses or misdemeanor offenses that
result in death, up to two hundred thousand dollars for Class A misdemeanor
offenses, up to twenty five thousand dollars for Class B misdemeanor offenses,
and up to ten thousand dollars for violations. Alternatively, greater fines can be
imposed under sections 12.55.035(c)(2) or (3) of the Alaska Statutes, which allow
for fines up to three times the pecuniary gain realized, or three times the
damages caused by the offense.
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These considerations are in addition to statutory and common law
factors Alaska courts consider in deciding any criminal sentence.143
Generally, it is not difficult to frame these factors in a way to justify
substantial fines under any of the penalty matrices available for use
against organizations. If the organization is large, a substantial fine
would be justified so that it has an appreciable penalty or deterrent
impact on the organization’s operations. The fine would likewise need
to be large to cause other similarly situated organizations to take notice
and action to ensure they do not commit similar errors.
Consider two examples. First, if a fishing lodge allows its clients to
commit hunting and fishing violations to ensure they catch a lot of fish
and have a good time, a small fine would not act as a sufficient
deterrent. Because these lodges often have significant revenues, fines at
the top of the penalty range set forth in section 12.55.035(c) of the Alaska
Statutes would be necessary and justified. These are common sense
arguments that are likely to have traction with the sentencing court.
Second, imagine a service station operating as an LLC that knowingly
functions with leaking underground fuel tanks. The situation comes to
light when diesel range organics are discovered in a nearby creek.
Investigation traces the fuel back to the service station and additional
investigation produces evidence that the manager had been aware of the
leak for several months. The Alaska Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC) hires a private environmental services firm to
design and implement a clean-up and remediation plan for the polluted
land and water and to monitor the water quality of the creek for five
years. The total cost for these services exceeds a million dollars. Under
section 12.55.035(c)(3) of the Alaska Statutes, the potential fine against
the LLC could exceed three million dollars. This fine could be in
addition to the restitution owed to the state for the cost of the clean-up
and remediation work itself. Admittedly, the sentencing court, in
imposing the fine, would have to consider how section 12.55.035(e)(3) of
the Alaska Statutes would affect the company’s ability to pay restitution
to the DEC. However, if the company is large enough, it is easy to
picture the court imposing the full fine. Penalties of this magnitude can

142. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035(e) (2006).
143. The court considers a defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation, the need
to confine or isolate the defendant to prevent further public harm, the extent to
which the sentence to be imposed will deter the defendant as well as other
members of the community from future criminal conduct, and the extent to
which the sentence will reaffirm societal norms or the community’s
condemnation of the conduct. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.005; State v. Chaney, 477
P.2d 441, 443 (Alaska 1970).
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provide a strong incentive for organizations to resolve potential criminal
liability quickly.144
Because criminal conduct exposes the organization to potentially
substantial criminal penalties and negative publicity, an organization
will often terminate or discipline the responsible employees, cooperate
with investigating agencies, and may hire consultants for the design of
new protocols to avoid similar mistakes in the future. These are all
constructive steps moving forward from the misconduct and are factors
a sentencing court is to consider in assessing a fine against an
organization pursuant to section 12.55.035(e) of the Alaska Statutes.
B.

Collateral Consequences

Collateral consequences triggered by a conviction will also be a
powerful force shaping the course of many prosecutions. Organizations
are generally required to report all pending liabilities in their annual
financial statements. This typically includes pending criminal cases as
well as any completed cases for which the organization is on
probation.145 Disclosure of a pending criminal case or conviction can be
damaging to an organization’s public image or reputation. The publicity
from prosecution would likely tarnish the image of a company and
undo any marketing efforts that the company previously undertook.
Further, the prosecution would likely damage the company’s image
amongst stockholders, creditors and Wall Street analysts, causing
significant financial repercussions.
Debarment is another significant collateral consequence. Both
federal and state law allows the respective sovereigns to refuse to do
business with organizations that have been convicted of or otherwise
suspected of crimes or dishonest business practices.146 At the federal
level, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is particularly
vigilant in debarring organizations that are convicted or suspected of

144. Defense attorneys commonly argue that the State should not seek the full
measure of fines authorized by section 12.35.055 of Alaska Statutes because
doing so would preclude the organization from devoting resources to correct the
problem that led to the violation, or to pay restitution. This is a fair argument in
many instances.
145. Probation is imposed by the sentencing court and can be up to ten years.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090(c) (2006).
146. In response to Congressional oversight hearings regarding the
mismanagement of federal contracts, the Office of Management and Budget
developed a government-wide debarment and suspension system in the early
1980s. See Brief History of EPA’s Debarment Program, http://www.epa.gov/
ogdunix1/sdd/history.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2008).
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environmental crimes.147 Debarment is damaging because a large
percentage of Alaska companies are the recipients of federal or state
contracts.148 The loss of these contracts can be financially crippling to
companies. The State of Alaska also has legislative authority to debar
companies but, unfortunately, rarely uses that power.149
By way of an example, consider a small bush air service that
transports mail year round and a steady number of government
biologists as passengers during the summer. If the company knowingly
allows passengers to transport alcohol to local option dry
communities150 on its flights, it could be prosecuted for violations of
Alaska’s alcohol importation laws.151 A conviction could potentially
trigger federal or state debarment and thereby jeopardize the air
service’s ability to retain the mail or biologist travel contracts. This could
constitute another financial blow to the company in addition to the fines
or consequences that flow from the prosecution.152

147. The EPA is statutorily required to debar companies convicted of
violations of section 508 of the Clean Water Act or section 306 of the Clean Air
Act. The EPA also has the discretionary authority to suspend or debar
companies based on indictments, information or adequate evidence involving
environmental crimes, contract fraud, embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery,
poor performance, non-performance, or false statements. See Suspension and
Debarment Program, http://www.epa.gov/ogdunix1/sdd/debarment.htm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2008.) Other executive branch agencies also have the
authority to suspend and debar.
148. Based on the Author’s anecdotal observations that the federal
government is very active in Alaska and therefore contracts with many Alaskan
companies for services and products.
149. While the state has legislative authority to debar entities, it rarely does
so. State debarment is controlled by sections 36.30.635–36.30.685 of the Alaska
Statutes. The grounds for debarment are set out in section 36.30.640 of the
Alaska Statutes and include a broad range of unethical or fraudulent conduct.
Nevertheless, these consequences are rarely, if ever, invoked. In response to an
inquiry to the Alaska Department of Law, the Department told the Author of
only one state suspension or debarment matter. In the Author’s view, the State,
by failing to more proactively utilize its debarment authority, forgoes a powerful
deterrence tool.
150. Communities can elect to ban the sale or possession of alcohol. ALASKA
STAT. § 4.11.491 (2006).
151. The Alaska Statutes criminalize such conduct. ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.11.499,
16.200(e) (2006).
152. Significantly, the plane used to illegally transport the alcohol could be
subject to forfeiture. ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.220(a)(3) (2006).
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IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROSECUTORS
A. No Fifth Amendment Privilege
Prosecutors gain several practical advantages by filing charges
against organizations as opposed to individuals. The first, and perhaps
most significant, is that an organization does not have a Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. A prosecutor can use
organizational agents as witnesses to testify about corporate practices or
records.153 In Amato v. United States,154 the First Circuit, relying largely on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Braswell v. United States,155 explained
why the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination does
not protect corporate records.156
The Alaska Supreme Court subscribed to the collective-entity
doctrine in Pratt v. Kirkpatrick.157 Citing many of the same cases relied
upon in Amato, the court held that a records custodian for the financial
records of a limited partnership could not rely upon the Fifth
Amendment or Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution to resist a
subpoena for the partnership’s financial records.158 Importantly, the
court found the self-incrimination protections provided by the Alaska
Constitution were no broader than protections provided by the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.159
Because of these principles, defense attorneys will be hard-pressed
to successfully preclude the production of an organization’s documents
sought pursuant to a subpoena or search warrant. Organizations are
prolific producers of documents, reports, memoranda, and email that
evidence their decisions and actions. In the event of criminal conduct,

153. This presumes the agent does not have a personal Fifth Amendment
right to assert.
154. 450 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2006).
155. 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
156. 450 F.3d at 49–50 (holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a
personal privilege enjoyed only by individuals). The Fifth Amendment’s
privilege “‘is designed to prevent the use of legal process to force from the lips
of the accused individual the evidence necessary to convict him or to force him
to produce and authenticate any personal documents or effects that might
incriminate him.’” Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944)).
This is true even if the records incriminate the custodian personally. Id. (citing
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 88 (1974)).
157. 718 P.2d 962, 967–68 (Alaska 1986).
158. See id. at 968.
159. Id. (“While we are not limited by the federal courts in interpreting our
own constitution, in this instance we are not persuaded by [the appellant’s]
arguments to interpret the Alaska self-incrimination provision more broadly
than the federal courts have construed the fifth amendment.”).
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any such documents would be invaluable to the prosecution, as they
may demonstrate the organization’s knowledge or intent. At the very
least, the documents can confirm the individual agent’s intent or
knowledge.
B.

Avoiding Hearsay

Common hearsay problems can also be avoided if an organization
rather than an individual is charged. Employee or agent statements
regarding the conduct of the organization will be admissible against the
organization should the declarant invoke a personal Fifth Amendment
right not to testify or otherwise make him or herself unavailable for trial.
The admissions of these agents are not hearsay if offered against the
organization because the law imputes them to the organization itself;
under Alaska Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), the admissions are considered
admissions of the party opponent.160 This subsection excludes as nonhearsay statements that are made by an agent or servant concerning
matters within the scope of that individual’s agency or employment and
made during the existence of the agency or employment relationship.
This is a broadly interpreted exclusion161 that encompasses a wide range
of employee statements regarding employer practices, work conditions,
and decision-making that frequently provide invaluable evidence for the
prosecution.
C.

Corporations Can Be Tried In Absentia

Corporations cannot ignore a summons to appear for arraignment.
Pursuant to Rule 4(a)(3) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure,
corporations that fail to appear may be tried in absentia.162 The trial of
an absent corporation would be a slam-dunk for the state. The
prosecutor could admit evidence to the jury without objection. The
160. See also United States v. Petraia Mar., Ltd., 489 F. Supp. 2d 90, 94–99 (D.
Me. 2007) (discussing the analogous provision under the federal rules).
161. See Klawock Heenya Corp. v. Dawson Constr., 778 P.2d 219, 220 (Alaska
1989) (the exclusion covers statements that “merely ‘concern’ the employee’s
duties” (citations omitted)).
162. The rule provides, “[i]f a defendant corporation fails to appear after
being duly summoned, a plea of not guilty shall be entered by the court if the
court is empowered to try the offense for which the summons was issued and
the court may proceed to trial and judgment without further process.” ALASKA
R. CRIM. PROC. 4(a)(3). The rule does not define “corporation” and the author is
not aware of any case that interprets this rule. Admittedly, a court could
interpret “corporation” to be narrower than the term “organization” as it is used
in section 11.16.130 (2006) of the Alaska Statutes. It is therefore unclear whether
other types of organizations could be tried in absentia.
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prosecutor could then ask the jury to convict a business which was
perfectly happy to injure Alaska or Alaskans in some way but was
unwilling to show up when invited to an Alaskan courtroom for its own
trial. Assuming the prosecutor has presented sufficient evidence of the
charged offenses, it is likely juries will feel little compunction in
returning guilty verdicts. Upon conviction, the prosecutor could ask the
judge to issue a judgment against the corporation and that judgment
could be sent to the Attorney General’s Collection Section for collection.
D. Organizations Engender Less Sympathy
The criminal jury instructions commonly employed in Alaska state
courts invariably include an instruction that directs the jury to disregard
any sympathy for the defendant during its deliberations.163
Nevertheless, any prosecutor will tell you that jurors rarely dispatch
their obligations without sympathizing to some degree with the
defendant. If an employee engages in improper conduct to primarily
benefit his or her employer (as opposed to directly benefiting him or
herself) or if the employee engages in conduct at the behest of his or her
employer, jurors may be loathe to find the individual guilty of the
offense. This problem is largely eliminated if the company is tried.
Regardless of the factual scenario involved, juries are far less prone to
feel sympathy for an organization.164 Most often, the organization is a
for-profit company, and juries realize their decision, like the
organization’s decision to engage in the criminal conduct, is a decision
about money. Juries seem to struggle far less with the question of
whether an organization should pay a fine than the question of whether
an individual should go to jail.

163. Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction 1.07, “Evaluation of Evidence,” is one
such example. It instructs jurors “not be influenced by sentiment, prejudice,
passion or public opinion” in evaluating the evidence. Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction Committee, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.07, available at
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ins/1.07.doc.
164. This is true notwithstanding Alaska Pattern Jury Instruction 1.48,
“Corporate Defendant,” which instructs juries not to treat a corporate defendant
any differently than it would an individual defendant. Criminal Pattern Jury
Instruction Committee, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.48, available at
http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ins/1.48.doc.
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V. CHARGING CONSIDERATIONS
A. Factors to Weigh
The foregoing discussion is meant to illustrate that organizational
criminal liability is very broad and has potential application to many
situations. Nevertheless, these prosecutions can be complex and time
intensive, and the outcome of any such prosecution is seldom, if ever,
certain. It follows that a prosecution may not be warranted or be the best
use of limited resources in every instance. A number of practical
considerations should inform any decision to prosecute or not prosecute
an organization.
Assuming the prosecutor believes he or she can prove all the
elements of the potential charges, the foremost consideration is the
prosecution’s objective in pursuing the criminal charges against this
organization. Key to this concern is the question of punishment. Is the
goal to punish the organization? Is the goal to achieve restitution? Or is
the goal to ensure future compliance by this organization or similarlysituated organizations? Most often the answer is a mixture of all three,
but that is not always the case. If the organization is one that has few
assets or no longer exists, the prosecution may yield a conviction and a
fine or restitution order that cannot be collected. Alternatively, if the
organization continues to operate and the conduct at issue could
reoccur, or involves an activity that has not been monitored or heavily
regulated in the past, a better result may be achieved through less
adversarial means. Instead of a criminal prosecution, perhaps there is an
administrative or civil remedy.165
In answering these questions, the prosecutor should consider the
following factors.166 The first and foremost consideration is whether the
prosecution is deserved. Multiple factors will weigh on this
determination, including whether the injury was caused by egregious or
intentional conduct or a rogue employee, and the degree to which
management was complicit in causing the injury. It will also be
important to determine whether the conduct was an isolated violation or
part of a series of violations, and if the organization knew the conduct
was prohibited.

165. To be sure, if such options exist, defense counsel will suggest it to the
prosecution.
166. This list is not exhaustive or universally applicable. Depending on the
circumstances, other factors not listed may be relevant and some listed factors
may be irrelevant.
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These factors beg the question: is a prosecution warranted? A
corollary to this question is the recognition that a criminal prosecution
carries a significant stigma and is not warranted or necessary in every
circumstance. With respect to considerations of practicality, the
following factors should be evaluated and go to the central question of
what can and will be achieved by prosecuting the organization:
First, will prosecution deter this organization? Answering this
question will require analyzing the likelihood of significant penalties
such as fines or probation. It will also mean determining if any illegal
gains will be returned, and if the conduct gave the organization an
advantage over its competitors.167
Second, will prosecution deter other similarly-situated
organizations? Determining this means researching whether similarlysituated organizations exist and if the potential penalties would deter
them. The penalties may also impact the industry as a whole.
Third, will prosecution promote future compliance? Prosecutors
must consider whether including a compliance program in the penalty
would address the conduct at issue.
Fourth, is restitution owed to a broad range of entities or
individuals? Considerations will include the necessity of prosecution to
obtain restitution, the effectiveness of individual claims, and the ability
of the organization to pay damages.
Finally, will a prosecution play well in the public’s view?
Prosecutors should determine whether the public will support legal
action, an enforcement program more generally, and participate in such
a program by reporting violations.
Depending on the answers to these questions, a prosecutor may
determine that prosecution is not the best alternative. The best practice
is to make this determination early and not to pursue prosecutions in
situations not warranting the effort or resources.
To illustrate these points, consider as an example the potential
prosecution of a bartender for selling alcohol to an underage patron.
Faced with an underage “furnishing” crime, police officers will typically

167. A sentencing court may suspend criminal fines for the period of
probation. ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.080, 12.55.090 (2006). Such “suspended fines”
are used as a “hammer” to force a defendant to comply with the conditions of
probation the court imposes. If, during the probation period, the defendant does
not comply with these conditions, the prosecution can petition the sentencing
court to revisit the sentence and impose all or a portion of the sentence that was
suspended. Those determinations are made by the trial judge pursuant to a
preponderance of the evidence standard. See Wallace v. State, 829 P.2d 1208,
1210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); Andrew v. State, 835 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1992).
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cite the individual bartender for a Title 4 “furnishing” offense.168 If
convicted, and if a first-time offender, the bartender will likely receive a
suspended imposition of sentence, a year’s probation, and a small fine,
assuming the prosecutor can convince a jury not to nullify the verdict.
On the other hand, if there is a good reason to charge the bartender’s
employer—perhaps a large bar or restaurant—with the same Title 4
violation, that employer will face a much larger potential fine. If the
employer has committed similar offenses through other employees, each
of those incidents may be brought to the sentencing judge’s attention
and would powerfully bolster the prosecutor’s sentencing case. Fines
could be conditioned on the employer ensuring that its employees
commit no further violations. The employer could also be affirmatively
required to notify law enforcement officers of any and all future
violations.169 In addition, the court may require the employer to provide
enhanced training for employees at their own expense. Prosecuting the
employer is a better use of prosecutorial resources. Importantly, the
prosecution of the employer provides a mechanism to prevent future,
similar infractions by other employees. The employer will likely be more
proactive in policing its employees and will be under an affirmative
duty to report all future violations. Further, it is likely that other similar
establishments or employers will take notice of the sentence and will
likewise do a better job of policing their operations and employees.
These would all be positive outcomes.
B.

Case Study: Strategica Import-Export Financial Group, LLC

A four-defendant case recently prosecuted by the Office of Special
Prosecutions, State v. Jeremy Oliver,170 further illustrates why prosecutors
should consider charging organizations and how they can use those
prosecutions to achieve better case outcomes.
The case arose from a failed salmon processing facility in Ekuk,
Alaska in 2004.171 The failure was an economic disaster for the local
economy.172 None of the fishermen who had delivered fish to the facility

168. ALASKA STAT. § 4.16.051 (2006).
169. As explained supra Part IV.A, organizations do not have Fifth
Amendment protection and may be compelled to make statements against their
interest.
170. These defendants were prosecuted as codefendants under case numbers
3DI-07-016CR, 3DI-07-017CR, 3DI-07-018CR, 3DI-07-019CR, respectively (Alaska
Dist. Ct. information filed Jan. 5, 2007).
171. Information at 7, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07018CR (Nov. 26, 2007).
172. Id. at 18.
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were paid for their catches and none of the workers who had worked at
the facility were paid for their labor.173 Jeremy Oliver, a young man with
limited fishing and processing experience, had formed Wild Alaskan
Seafood Company, LLC (“Wild Alaskan Seafood Company”) for the
purpose of the Ekuk processing venture.174 Oliver was able to lease and
open the Ekuk facility using financing brokered by Jay Enis, a Florida
merchant banker.175 Enis formed Strategica Import-Export Financial
Group, LLC (“Strategica”) for the purpose of financing the Ekuk salmon
processing venture.176 Oliver and Wild Alaskan Seafood Company hired
dozens of workers to run the facility and accepted more than a million
pounds of fish from the fishermen.177 The venture failed before the fish
could be processed, and very little of the fish was ever delivered to a
purchaser.178 The vast majority of the fish spoiled and ultimately had to
be destroyed.179 As a result, the fishermen and Ekuk processors were
never paid.180
Alaska statutes criminalize the processing of adulterated seafood.181
The offense is a class A misdemeanor.182 The state prosecuted all four
defendants—Oliver, Wild Alaska Seafood Company, Enis, and
Strategica—for this offense, as well as several additional, related
offenses.183 Ultimately, Oliver, Wild Alaskan Seafood Company and
Strategica each pled guilty to a charge.184 The court sentenced Oliver to
serve 180 days in jail (with 140 days suspended) and to pay, along with
Wild Alaskan Seafood Company, more than $56,000 in restitution to the
fishermen and workers.185 Because Oliver and Wild Alaskan Seafood

173. Id.
174. Id. at 4, 7–8.
175. Id. at 7–10 .
176. Id.
177. Id. at 15.
178. Id. at 17.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 18.
181. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 34.030 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 17.20.305
(2006).
182. See ALASKA STAT. § 17.20.305 (2006).
183. Information at 1–2, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07018CR (Nov. 26, 2007).
184. State v. Jeremy Oliver, 3DI-07-015CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. judgment entered
Nov. 26, 2007); State v. Wild Alaska Seafood, LLC, 3DI-07-016CR (Alaska Dist.
Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007); State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group,
3DI-07-017CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007).
185. State v. Oliver, 3DI-07-015CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. judgment entered Nov.
26, 2007); State v. Wild Alaskan Seafood Co., LLC, 3DI-07-016CR (Alaska Dist.
Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007).
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Company have few assets,186 it is unlikely that much of this restitution
will ever be paid. Oliver and Wild Alaskan Seafood Company were
prosecuted to punish them for their misdeeds rather than to make the
injured fishermen and workers whole.187 The court ordered Strategica to
pay more than $180,000 in restitution.188 The state agreed to dismiss the
charges against Enis in exchange for Strategica’s plea and payment.189
The case against Strategica was meant to prosecute that company for its
misconduct, as well as to provide at least some restitution to the
fishermen and workers.
Oliver was clearly the primary culprit of this scheme. Oliver came
up with the plan to operate the Ekuk facility and was in charge when it
failed. Nevertheless, once the scheme failed, Oliver and Wild Alaskan
Seafood Company lacked assets and would never be able to pay much
in restitution. Enis and Strategica had assets but were not as directly
involved in the management and operation of the Ekuk facility. Thus,
the question for the Office of Special Prosecutions was whether it could
prove Enis and Strategica were criminally liable for the Ekuk failure
and, if so, whether they warranted criminal prosecution. The answer to
both questions was “yes.”190
Strategica’s conduct was egregious. Enis and Strategica had no
experience in the Alaska seafood industry. Nevertheless, with little due
diligence and equally little oversight, Strategica provided Wild Alaskan

186. Information at 8–11, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI07-018CR (Nov. 26, 2007).
187. Though Oliver had few assets, there was a financial interest that the
Author suspects prompted Oliver to plea the case on his behalf and on behalf of
Wild Alaskan Seafood Company. When Oliver formed that company, he
included his father Michael , a real estate agent in California, as a member.
Information at 7, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07-018CR
(Nov. 26, 2007). Oliver’s father had assets and was troubled about his potential
financial exposure for the company’s liabilities. The father signed off on the plea
agreement for Wild Alaskan Seafood Company on the understanding that he
would not be a prosecution target and would most likely not have to personally
satisfy the restitution judgment entered against Wild Alaskan Seafood
Company. Michael Oliver Aff., State v. Wild Alaska Seafood, LLC, 3DI-07016CR.
188. State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC, 3DI-07-018CR (Alaska
Dist. Ct. judgment entered Nov. 26, 2007). Strategica’s restitution was paid upfront. The plea agreement required Strategica to pay the total restitution amount
prior to the company’s change of plea and sentencing. Id.
189. State v. Enis, 3DI-07-019CR (Alaska Dist. Ct. dismissal signed Nov. 23,
2007).
190. Both Enis and Strategica warranted prosecution for the same reasons.
The discussion herein is limited to Strategica because of the focus of this article
on organizational criminal liability.
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Seafood Company with $650,000 in financing for a risky venture191 that
would operate in a remote locale more than five thousand miles from
Strategica’s location in Miami.192 Strategica enabled Oliver and Wild
Alaskan Seafood Company by providing the financial means for them to
launch the Ekuk facility. Thereafter, Strategica did little to oversee their
operations or to ensure their success. This conduct was careless, it was
intentional, and it had a devastating impact on the Ekuk fishery and the
local economy.
Practical considerations also supported the decision to prosecute
Strategica. Most importantly, the State believed prosecution would be
the most effective way to collect restitution for the fishermen and
workers. More than a hundred, perhaps more than two hundred, people
were financially injured due to the Ekuk failure.193 While some of these
people filed civil actions against the defendants, those suits made little
progress and, even if successful, stood to benefit a small number of
individuals. In contrast, a criminal prosecution could recover restitution
for all those who did not get paid. Of the potential defendants, only Enis
and Strategica had any real financial resources.194 Therefore, it was
important that Strategica be prosecuted.
Additionally, the prosecution of Strategica would play well in the
realm of public opinion. Strategica was a company that recklessly
entered the state fishing industry to make a profit for out-of-state
investors and ended up causing significant financial injuries to many
Alaskans. In addition to the direct financial losses inflicted on the Ekuk
fishermen and workers, Strategica’s actions could have inflicted
significant harm to the reputation of Alaskan salmon. The Alaska
seafood industry relies on the high reputation of “wild Alaskan salmon”
to market its product and has spent years and millions of public
relations dollars to build up that reputation.195 If some of the damaged
Ekuk salmon had actually made it into the marketplace and sickened
unsuspecting consumers, the reputation and marketability of Alaskan
salmon would have been dealt a significant blow. Considering the

191. Salmon processing is by its very nature a risky undertaking. Catches, and
the market, vary from year to year and can always be impacted by factors—fish
counts, weather events, economic uncertainties—that are beyond anyone’s
control.
192. Information at 6–8, 11, State v. Strategica Imp.-Exp. Fin. Group, LLC,
3DI-07-018CR (Nov. 26, 2007).
193. Id. at 18.
194. Id. at 8.
195. See, e.g., Press Release, Sarah Palin, Governor, State of Alaska, Palin Asks
for Changes to Fish Farm Proposal (Apr. 4, 2007), available at http://gov
.state.ak.us/archive-51004.html.
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reckless manner in which Strategica acted to enable and finance Oliver
and Wild Alaskan Seafood Company, the State believed the Alaskans
would overwhelmingly support Strategica’s prosecution and the
Department of Environmental Conservation’s continued efforts to
regulate seafood processing facilities.
Finally, the State believed prosecuting Strategica would serve as a
deterrent to future reckless investment in the Alaska seafood industry
by outside entities. The prosecution resulted in significant financial
penalties—the restitution payment—and would receive significant
publicity. This result would certainly deter Strategica from future
similar conduct and, it is hoped, would deter other similarly situated
entities from doing anything similar.

CONCLUSION
The ability to file criminal charges against an organization in
addition to, or in lieu of, charges against individual agents is a powerful
tool available to prosecutors. The prosecution of organizations must be
considered, whenever feasible, to deter future wrongdoing.
Furthermore, it is far more efficient to prosecute the organization that
controls a large number of agents engaging in prohibited conduct rather
than prosecuting each agent individually.
Prosecuting the organization makes sense for a variety of
additional reasons. First, significant criminal fines can be imposed
against organizations. Second, organizations—rational entities with a
bottom line and a strong preference against negative publicity—tend to
be prosecution averse. This fact is good news for the prosecution
because it means a trial can be avoided and constructive changes can be
implemented as part of any resolution.196 Third, organizations enjoy
fewer constitutional protections than do individual defendants and, as
such, can make use of fewer evidentiary rules to limit the prosecution’s
evidence. Lastly, the prosecution of an organization as well as
individual defendants could strengthen the prosecution’s hand during
plea negotiations. The organization may be persuaded to accept a plea in

196. For example, in pollution cases, resolutions often require defendant
companies to implement environmental compliance management systems—
detailed plans that dictate the specific procedures and safety measures the
company is required to implement for a period of time. These compliance
agreements are typically more stringent than any planning or contingency plan
requirements imposed by statute or regulation. In other words, to resolve the
criminal charges, organizations will agree to be far more proactive in guarding
against future infractions. Such agreements are not only helpful, but also
provide good publicity for both the organization and the prosecution.
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return for dismissal against certain individual officers, or vice-versa. By
charging both, the prosecution increases its options for a successful and
beneficial resolution.
Several potential explanations for why Alaska prosecutors rarely
charge organizations for the criminal conduct of their agents are
proffered in the introduction. None satisfactorily explain this
phenomenon. Yes, such prosecutions will likely differ in some respects
from the prosecution of individual defendants. Yes, organizational
defendants may hire experienced defense counsel. And yes, such
prosecutions might, in some cases, penalize stockholders who did not
know about the wrongdoing. But these drawbacks, to the extent they are
legitimate at all, are insignificant compared to the potential benefits that
such prosecutions can realize. Quite simply, prosecutors should file
charges against organizations more frequently. Such change may not
happen quickly; nonetheless, it is time to adjust course and to start
looking more closely at organizational targets. Successful criminal
prosecutions of organizations can be a significant deterrent that causes
organizations to take significant steps to better monitor the behavior of
their agents and to prevent criminal conduct in the course of their
operations.

